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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960135-CA 
V. 
DWAYNE MARVIN CARLSON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION ANP NATURE QF PRQCEEPINSS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of receiving 
or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1316(2) (1993) (a copy of 
the statute is attached as addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court appropriately instruct the jury 
concerning a permissive evidentiary presumption based on Utah 
law? 
This Court reviews the instructions given to the jury for 
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court in giving 
the instructions. Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 293 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 
4 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 
1993) . The instructions must be viewed as a whole to determine 
whether they fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law. 
Smoot. 293 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4; Lucero, 866 P.2d at 3. 
2. Did the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument reach the 
level of prosecutorial misconduct? 
When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, this 
Court must determine whether counsel's remarks called to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified 
in considering in determining their verdict, and whether, under 
the circumstances of this case, the effect of the remarks was 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that without the statements the result would have been 
more favorable for the defendant. State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750, 
754-55 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996); State 
v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with receiving or transferring a 
stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1316 (2) (1993); giving false information to 
a peace officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-506(1) (1995); license plate and registration card 
violation, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-la-1305(1) (1993); and driving on a suspended license, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 
(1994) (R. 7-10). At his trial on October 11, 1995, defendant 
admitted under oath that he drove on a suspended license, gave 
false information to the officer who stopped him, and had neither 
a valid license plate a valid registration card at the time he 
was stopped (R. 199, 220, 226-28, 230, 286). The jury was 
instructed to render a verdict only as to the charge of receiving 
a stolen motor vehicle, and, after a one-day trial, the jury 
convicted him of the charge (R. 90, 120, 294). The remaining 
counts were dismissed on the State's motion (R. 121, 294). 
Defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison and a $10,000 fine (R. 145). The court stayed the 
sentence and imposed 36 months probation, which included twelve 
months in jail and miscellaneous recommendations (R. 145-46) . 
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Defendant appeals his conviction, challenging the trial 
court's instructions to the jury and the prosecutor's closing 
argument. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Near 8:00 p.m. on July 22, 1995, Officer John Sheets was on 
patrol driving southbound near 2450 South Main Street in his 
marked patrol car when he noticed a 1981 brown Mazda pickup in 
the northbound lane being driven by defendant (R. 175-78). The 
Mazda was missing its front license and the officer decided to 
turn around and stop the truck (R. 176). As the patrol car 
turned around, and before the officer could activate his lights 
or pull up behind the Mazda, defendant accelerated, cut through 
the traffic, and turned onto a side street (R. 176, 186-87, 276). 
The officer temporarily lost the truck and spent three minutes 
cruising the area before finding it parked in a parking lot 
behind a business at 233 0 South Main Street with defendant behind 
the wheel (R. 176-77, 195). The officer pulled in behind the 
Mazda, approached defendant, told him that he was being detained 
because of the missing license plate, and asked for his driver's 
license and registration (R. 177-78, 240). Defendant was acting 
"very nervous" and admitted that he had neither with him (R. 178, 
183, 188), while, in fact, defendant knew he was driving on a 
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suspended license and had not found any registration in the truck 
(R. 178, 220, 226, 228, 230, 286). The officer then asked for 
defendant's name, date of birth, and social security number (R. 
178). Defendant identified himself as "Steven Carlson", gave a 
date of birth and social security number, and, as the officer was 
writing down the information, suddenly declared, "This vehicle is 
not stolen." (R. 178-79, 193-94). The officer had not asked for 
the information, had not mentioned anything about a stolen truck 
to that point, did not notice any sign of forced entry into the 
truck, and could see no reason for the outburst (R. 179, 187, 
193-94, 231) . 
When Officer Sheets called in the identifying information he 
had received from defendant, he also asked for assistance (R. 
180). Sergeant Greg Carlson arrived about the time dispatch 
informed Sheets that the social security number did not belong to 
Steven Carlson (R. 180). Believing that defendant gave him a 
false identity, Sheets arrested him and placed him in the patrol 
car (R. 180, 191). He again asked for defendant's name, date of 
birth and social security number, to which defendant responded 
with "Marvin Carlson" and a different, albeit no less inaccurate, 
date of birth and social security number (R. 180-81, 224-26). 
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While Officer Sheets checked the new information and learned 
of its inaccuracy, Sergeant Carlson had dispatch check the 
license plate on the back of the Mazda (R. 181, 196). He 
discovered that the plate was registered to a Buick (R. 182) . He 
then checked the vehicle identification number and discovered 
that the Mazda had recently been reported stolen from Salt Lake 
City (R. 182, 195). Upon hearing this information, Officer 
Sheets read defendant his Miranda rights (R. 182). Defendant 
said he understood his rights and agreed to speak to the officer 
(R. 182-83, 219). Sheets specifically asked defendant where he 
got the truck, to which defendant responded that he had "just 
picked up the vehicle from a friend" whom he identified as Steve 
Johnson (R. 183-84, 235) . Defendant mentioned no other name and 
did not know how the officers could locate Johnson (R. 184). 
Defendant surrendered the truck keys to Officer Sheets who 
gave them to Sergeant Carlson (R. 185). Carlson stayed with the 
truck until the owner, Steve Clark, arrived to recover it (R. 
196). Clark noticed that the camper shell from the back of the 
truck was missing and that an after-market ignition had been 
installed *to the side on the dash" which fit the key defendant 
had given the officers (R. 166-67, 171-73, 191). Such an 
ignition permits the car to be started without using the 
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original ignition (R. 168, 171-72). He testified that the truck 
.had been taken from his used car lot on South Main Street, so 
there were no plates on it at the time and the keys, which are 
kept locked in the building, were left behind (R. 163-64, 167, 
173) . 
At trial, defendant testified, with varying degrees of 
consistency, that he got the truck from a girl named Laura who 
had dated his friend, Steve Johnson, years earlier (R. 207-08). 
He claimed to have seen her trying to push-start the truck at 
1:00 in the morning and stopped to help her (R. 207-09). When 
they could not get it started, she agreed to his offer of help 
the next day and gave him the truck keys (R. 209-10). He took 
her to his friend's house and let the two of them borrow his car 
to run errands while he went to bed (R. 210). When he woke up, 
his friend told him that Laura had taken his car to go home and 
change and would be back soon; however, she never returned (R. 
211). Defendant began looking for Laura, and, after a couple of 
days, went to where they had left her Mazda in hopes that she had 
gotten it fixed and left his car there (R. 212-13). The Mazda 
was still there, so defendant fixed it and used it to try to 
locate his own car (R. 213-14, 216-17). He claimed that nothing 
about the truck looked suspicious or made him wonder if it was 
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stolen, and adamantly claimed that there was only one ignition in 
the truck (R. 214-16, 237-38, 242), 
Defendant said that at the time he was stopped by Officer 
Sheets, he was on his way to apartments at 2360 South Main Street 
because he had been told that Laura and his car might be there 
(R. 217). After Officer Sheets stopped him, he lied to the 
officer because he knew he was driving on a suspended license and 
he had always been arrested for that in the past (R. 226-28). He 
claimed that he did not know that the truck was stolen until he 
heard dispatch say so over the officer's radio (R. 217-18); only 
then did he state that it was not stolen (R. 218). He testified 
that he did not tell Sheets about Laura because he did not know 
her last name, because Sheets was not interested in hearing 
defendant's story after defendant had already lied to him, and 
because Sheets was too busy gloating over the "big arrest" he had 
made (R. 221-22, 236-37, 241-42). 
Following his arrest, defendant contacted Steve Johnson who 
said that Laura had moved, he did not know where she was, and he 
had nothing to do with the truck (R. 212). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I; Defendant preserved only one of the many arguments 
he makes on appeal challenging the trial court's use of a jury 
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instruction outlining an evidentiary presumption. On the 
preserved claim, defendant's assertion that the jury instruction 
violates Utah statutory law because it includes language from 
Title 76 in a prosecution under Title 41 is without merit because 
the Utah Supreme Court has approved application of the general 
principle articulated in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1995) in 
prosecutions under Title 41. State v. Graves. 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam). Further, regardless of the propriety of 
including in the jury instruction reference to the presumption 
that defendant stole the truck, confidence in the verdict is not 
undermined because the facts the jury was required to find in 
order to employ that presumption are the same facts required for 
the jury to presume that defendant knew the truck was stolen, 
irrespective of whether he stole it. The absence of the language 
relating to defendant's identity as the thief would not change 
the evidence or the jury's ability to presume the requisite 
knowledge based on the underlying facts, rendering it highly 
unlikely that a different outcome would occur. Accordingly, any 
error in including the statutory language would be harmless. 
Because defendant made no objection on the remaining bases 
advanced in his brief and does not argue manifest injustice, this 
Court should refuse to review his remaining allegations. Should 
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this Court reach the merits of the unpreserved allegations, it 
will find that the instruction meets federal due process 
requirements and complies with Utah statutory and case law. 
Point II: The prosecutor's remarks in his rebuttal closing 
argument did not urge the jury to consider matters outside the 
evidence, but properly urged the jury to use their common sense 
in deliberating on defendant's testimony. The remarks 
demonstrated the implausibility of defendant's position and, when 
read in context, sought no more than was appropriate from the 
jury. Further, the remarks were not prejudicial where, even 
without them, there was sufficient compelling evidence to support 
the determination that defendant knew the truck was stolen. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT PRESERVED ONLY ONE OF HIS CHALLENGES TO THE 
PRESUMPTION INSTRUCTION, AND FAILS TO ASSERT ANY 
MANIFEST INJUSTICE ARGUMENT FOR HIS REMAINING POINTS; 
ACCORDINGLY, THIS COURT MAY REFUSE TO REACH THE MERITS 
OF HIS UNPRESERVED CLAIMS; ADDITIONALLY, THE PRESERVED 
ARGUMENT FAILS IN LIGHT OF STATE V. GRAVES AND BECAUSE 
NO HARM AROSE FROM THE LANGUAGE IN THE INSTRUCTION 
huu Introduction 
Over an objection by defendant, the trial court gave the 
following instruction to the jury: 
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Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and 
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown 
by the evidence in the case, that the person in 
possession of the stolen property stole the property 
and knew that the property was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in 
possession of property, (2) that the property was 
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in 
point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been 
given or appears from the evidence, then you may infer 
from those facts and find that the defendant stole the 
property and knew the property was stolen. 
(R. 110, attached as addendum B). Defendant challenges this 
instruction on appeal as violative of constitutional, statutory 
and case law. Appellant's Br. at 11-28. He claims that the 
instruction: 1) violated Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1995), 
because it is based in part on Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1995) 
dealing with theft and he was not charged with theft or larceny, 
and because the remainder of the presumption has no basis in the 
Utah Code or other penal statute and, hence, cannot be given to a 
jury (Appellant's Br. at 12-13); 2) should not have been given to 
the jury because the presumption is for the judge's use in 
determining whether the state's evidence is sufficient to warrant 
submission to a jury (id. at 13-17); 3) unconstitutionally shifts 
the burden of proof from the State to the defendant (id. at 17-
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24); 4) is erroneous because it is both irrational and arbitrary 
(id. at 25-26) ; and 5) prejudiced defendant by permitting the 
jury to believe that it could convict him based either on his 
mere presence in the vehicle or on a belief that he "should have 
been charged with stealing'7 (id. at 26-28) . 
IL. Defendant Failed To Preserve All But One Of His Arguments 
For Appeal 
This Court should reach the merits of only one of 
defendant's arguments in the first point of his brief because the 
remainder of his arguments are presented for the first time on 
appeal. The record reflects that defendant made the following 
objection to the relevant jury instruction below: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We're also objecting, your 
Honor, to the state's instruction and it's not 
numbered, so I will just briefly read it . . . [counsel 
reads the instruction]. . . 
Your Honor, I think that instruction is based on 
[section] 76-6-402. [Section] 76-6-402 does create a 
presumption. It creates a presumption that possession 
of property recently stolen is prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property. 
Mr. Carlson is not being charged with theft of 
this vehicle. He's being charged under the Motor 
Vehicle Code. He's being charged with possession of a 
stolen vehicle knowing that it was stolen. 
The first part of 76-6-402 states that the 
following presumption shall be applicable to this part, 
and it is the defense's position that it does not apply 
to other parts of the code and therefore --
12 
THE COURT: The Court is -- the case that was 
submitted by both counsel, the Court dealt with the 
instruction -- what's the case citation? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's State versus Graves, 
your Honor. 
[PROSECUTOR]: 717 Pacific 2d. 717. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Based on the Court's reading of that 
case, your objection is noted but overruled. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay, and your Honor, just let 
me state for the record briefly and I won't try to take 
up too much time on this, but I need to make a 
satisfactory record for appeal, that it's the defense's 
position that State versus Graves does not apply to 
this case because it was the -- the issue raised on 
appeal was whether there was sufficient evidence to 
convict. That's what the defendant argued. He did not 
at trial in the Graves case offer any explanation as to 
why he had possession of the stolen vehicle. 
What the Court in this case did is they said, 
well, 76-6-402 articulates a general presumption of 
law. Well, not a presumption but a general principle 
is the word that they used, and because it could be 
inferred by reasonable people that the defendant did 
not explain -- give any explanation why he had the 
stolen vehicle, that there was not necessarily 
insufficient evidence to convict, and I don't think 
that this case ever even addressed the issue of whether 
or not a jury instruction would be applicable in this 
particular case and'so I do not believe that it's on 
point. 
THE COURT: Your objection is respectfully 
overruled. The Court relies on the case cited. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, your Honor. 
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(R. 267-69, attached as addendum C). It is clear that 
defendant's objection below was two-fold: 1) the presumption did 
not apply because defendant was not charged under Title 76; and 
2) State v. Graves. 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), is not 
controlling case law. Defendant presents only the former 
argument on appeal. Appellant's Br., Point IA, first paragraph 
and a half, pp. 12-13. None of the remaining arguments in 
defendant's opening brief are included within the reasonable 
scope of the objections made below. Because defendant failed to 
provide the trial court with an opportunity to address the 
remainder of his appellate arguments in the first instance, this 
Court need not reach any of those arguments for the first time on 
appeal. Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) (where a party fails to object to 
an instruction "before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly 
the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection [,]" the appellate court will consider error only to 
avoid "manifest injustice"); State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 63 
(Utah 1993) (refusing to consider for the first time on appeal an 
objection to a jury instruction not raised at trial); State v. 
Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1226 n.9 (Utah App.) (refusing to consider 
for the first time on appeal several objections to a jury 
instruction), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
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Defendant fails to acknowledge that the arguments have not 
been preserved and does not argue manifest injustice or plain 
error. State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 554 n.l (Utah App. 1991) 
(equating the term "manifest injustice" with the "plain error" 
standard). Accordingly, this Court should refuse to address the 
defendant's unpreserved arguments. See State v. Becker. 803 P.2d 
1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990) (refusing to address the question of 
manifest injustice where defendant failed to present an argument 
on manifest injustice); cf• Pascual. 804 P.2d at 554 n.l 
(addressing an issue raised for the first time on appeal because 
defendant presented it as one of "plain error"). 
£^ Defendant's Preserved Argument Fails Because The Utah 
Supreme Court Has Approved Application of the Challenged 
Presumption To A Prosecution Under Title 41: Further. In 
Tftig C^se, N Q ffcrm Arose From The Lftngvege Used In The 
Instruction 
Defendant claims that the instruction violates Utah 
statutory law because it includes the language of section 76-6-
402(1) that permits the jury to presume that he stole the truck, 
and he was not charged with theft or larceny under that part of 
the code.1 Appellant's Br. at 12-13. However, as the trial 
defendant combines this preserved argument with an 
unpreserved argument regarding state statutory law (addressed 
infjCS/ Point ID2) . Appellant's Br. at 12-13. Together, these 
arguments present defendant's sole challenge to that part of the 
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court found, the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. 
Graves, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), disposes of this 
complaint (R. 268). 
In Graves, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the 
evidence upon which he was convicted of possession of a stolen 
vehicle in violation of section 41-1-112, i.e., whether the 
State established that he knew the vehicle was stolen. Graves, 
717 P.2d at 717. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the 
Utah Supreme Court determined that the presumption stated in 
section 76-6-402(1) articulated a general principle which 
encompassed the inference of guilty knowledge from unexplained or 
unsatisfactorily explained possession of stolen goods. Id. at 
717-18. Although it was not reviewing a jury instruction, the 
Court based its decision in large part on the United States 
Supreme Court's approval of such a jury instruction in Barnes v. 
United States. 412 U.S. 837, 839-40, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 2360 (1973), 
and noted a number of cases in which our supreme court has 
instruction permitting a presumption that he stole the vehicle. 
See id. at 12-13 & 14 n.3 (explaining that the alleged error in 
inclusion of the presumption that he stole the vehicle "is 
obvious and merits no further discussion"). Consequently, should 
this Court proceed to review the merits of defendant's 
unpreserved claims, it need not be concerned with the inclusion 
of this part of the instruction. 
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"accepted approvingly the inference as a factor in proving 
guilt". Graves, 717 P.2d at 717-18 (emphasis added). Our Court 
in essence said that, with the presumption which arises from the 
evidence, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have 
convicted defendant; in other words, the jury was able to use the 
inference as a factor in establishing defendant's guilt. 
Consequently, although Graves did not involve a jury instruction 
challenge, it is clear from Graves that the presumption is a 
factor which the finder of fact must have at its disposal in 
making its ultimate determination of guilt. Moreover, the Court 
noted that, despite the absence of a specific provision in Title 
41 reflecting the evidentiary presumption, the general principle 
applied in a prosecution under Title 41 without offense to the 
federal constitution. Id. at 717. Based on Graves, the use of 
the presumption instruction generally in a prosecution under 
Title 41 to guide the jury in determining defendant's knowledge 
that the vehicle was stolen does not warrant reversal of 
defendant's conviction. 
The question becomes whether use in the instruction of 
language permitting an inference that defendant stole the vehicle 
constitutes reversible error when such a finding is not necessary 
to convict defendant of receiving or transferring a stolen motor 
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vehicle. Defendant complains that use of the language violates 
section 76-1-503 because the State did not present evidence to 
support the presumption.2 Appellant's Br. at 12-13. However, 
this Court need not review the propriety of defendant's 
interpretation of section 76-1-503 or decide whether inclusion of 
the language constituted error because any error would not 
require reversal under the circumstances of this case. 
An error is harmless where wxthere is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings.'" State v. Villarreal. 857 P.2d 949, 958 (Utah App. 
1993) (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)). 
Reversal is required only when the likelihood of a different 
outcome is "sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the 
verdict." Villarreal, 857 P.2d at 958 (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, defendant must establish that absent the language in 
the instruction relating to the presumption that he stole the 
vehicle, there is a sufficiently high likelihood that the jury's 
verdict would have been different so that confidence in the 
verdict is undermined. 
2For the text of section 76-1-503, see infra, page 33. 
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Not only does defendant's prejudice argument fail to meet 
this burden (Appellant's Br. at 26-28), but it is highly unlikely 
that the jury would have acquitted defendant absent the 
challenged language where both the taking and the knowledge 
inferences arise from the same underlying facts. To presume that 
defendant stole the truck, the jury would necessarily have to 
find each of the underlying facts beyond a reasonable doubt: that 
defendant was in possession of recently stolen property at a 
point in time not too remote from the theft with no satisfactory 
explanation for his possession. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 
(1995). Had the jurors found those facts, they were also 
entitled to find that he knew the truck was stolen, irrespective 
of whether he stole it. See Barnes, 93 S. Ct. at 2360, 2362-63 
(approving use of a similarly-worded jury instruction raising a 
presumption of knowledge upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the underlying facts); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) 
(requiring that the State prove each element of a charged offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt); see also language of jury instruction 
in addendum B. The absence of the language relating to defendant 
stealing the truck would not change the fact that defendant 
admitted his possession of the truck, that defendant did not 
contest the fact that the truck was recently stolen, and that the 
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jury rejected as unsatisfactory his explanation for his 
possession of the truck. Inasmuch as the jury would still have 
been entitled to infer the requisite knowledge to convict 
defendant absent the language presuming that he stole the truck, 
confidence in the verdict is not undermined. 
Moreover, to the extent the presumption was used by the 
jury, it was necessarily used to find the knowledge element where 
the evidence adduced below clearly related to defendant's 
knowledge that the truck was stolen, not his identity as the 
thief. The challenged instruction permitted an inference that 
defendant knew the truck was stolen based on unexplained or 
unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently stolen 
property. The evidence was undisputed that defendant possessed 
the stolen vehicle, that it had been stolen from two to five days 
prior to his arrest, and that defendant knew he did not own it 
(R. 164, 176-78, 183-84, 207, 222-23). Testimony established that 
the truck had been stolen without the keys (R. 167, 173), that 
when it was recovered it had a secondary or after-market ignition 
switch on the dash which bypassed the original ignition, and that 
the key defendant ultimately returned with the truck fit the new 
ignition (R. 167-68, 171-73, 191). Further, defendant claimed 
that the woman he had first seen with the stolen truck had stolen 
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defendant's own car about eight days before his arrest (R. 175, 
207, 211-12, 217) . 
The instruction also provided that the jury should consider 
the "surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case" 
in determining whether to employ the inference (R. 110, Addendum 
B). Those circumstances, including defendant's own actions, do 
not support use of the inference that he stole the truck, but 
lend additional support to the jury's ability to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite knowledge to be 
guilty of receiving stolen property. Before Officer Sheets 
showed any interest in defendant specifically, defendant acted to 
avoid him by accelerating, cutting through traffic, and turning 
down a side street (R. 176, 186-87). This reasonably suggests 
that as soon as defendant noticed the patrol car making a u-turn, 
he had a reason to believe that the officer was focused on him. 
He knew nothing about the missing license plate at the time (R. 
233), claimed he didn't know the back plate didn't go to the 
truck (R. 240), and did not explain how the suspended license or 
outstanding warrant would have triggered the officer's interest 
when the officer didn't know his identity. The jury was free to 
conclude that defendant's actions resulted from his knowledge 
that he had no registration for the vehicle and no permission 
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from the rightful owner--either Steve Clark or, as defendant 
claimed, "Laura"--to drive or possess it. That his actions were 
not merely coincidental with the timing of the officer's u-turn 
is supported by the evidence that, after accelerating, cutting 
through traffic, and turning down a side street, defendant was 
found three minutes later in the parked truck behind a business 
at 2330 South Main Street (R. 176-77, 195), despite his testimony 
that he was on his way to apartments at 2360 South Main Street 
where he expected to find both Laura and his car after an eight-
day search (R. 207, 212, 217). Despite defendant's explanations 
for his actions, the jury reasonably could infer that defendant 
acted to avoid the officer because he knew that the truck was 
stolen, suspected that the officer might be looking for it, and 
wanted to avoid being found by the officer. 
Further, when defendant was stopped by police and asked for 
identifying information, he not only provided a false name, two 
false dates of birth, and a false social security number (R. 178-
81, 224-26), but spontaneously volunteered the statement, "This 
vehicle is not stolen" before the officers voiced any concern 
about the truck (R. 178-79). When asked thereafter where he got 
the truck, defendant told the officer a sequence of events 
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inconsistent with the explanation he gave at trial (Compare R. 
183-84, 221 with R. 207-14, 217, 236-37). 
Finally, the instruction requires that the jury evaluate 
defendant's explanation for his possession of the truck before it 
may utilize the inference (R. 110, Addendum B) .3 Defendant 
testified that he had the truck only because Laura had taken his 
own car, and he was using what he believed was her truck to find 
her. He explained that he happened upon Laura--a girl he knew 
had dated his friend Steve Johnson in the past — and the 
inoperable truck several days before his arrest (R. 207-08, 217). 
Laura told him that the truck belonged to her and Johnson (R. 
222). After trying unsuccessfully to fix the problem, defendant 
offered to work on the truck the next day, got the keys from 
Laura, and drove her to Doug Haycock's house (R. 209-10). 
Defendant let Laura and Doug take his car while he went to bed, 
only to find later that Laura had taken his car and never 
3This does not act to shift from the State the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that the 
property was stolen, as defense counsel expressly informed the 
jury in this case (R. 288). Barnes. 98 S. Ct. at 2362 n.9 
(recognizing that while the jury must weigh defendant's 
explanation before utilizing the inference, the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Mid have knowledge that 
the property was stolen, an essential element of the crime, 
remains on the government"). 
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returned (R. 210-11). Defendant claims that he looked for her, 
ultimately going to where they had left the truck, fixing it, and 
using it in his search for his own car (R. 212-17). However, he 
admitted that he did not contact the truck's alleged co-owner, 
Steve Johnson, to find Laura until after he'd looked for both 
Laura and his car for several days, and even then it was only 
after his arrest that he spoke to Johnson (id.). 
Both parties noted below that defendant's credibility 
factored heavily into the jury's final determination (R. 202, 
272). The credibility determination was made in the face of 
several inconsistent statements defendant made at trial (Compare 
R. 226-28 with R. 227, 229-30, 239; R. 207-10 with R. 221-22, 
236; R. 227 with R. 228; R. 218, 231 with R. 232-33; R. 212 with 
R. 175, 207, 211-12, 217). Witness credibility is a 
determination for the jury, State v. Hayes. 860 P.2d 968, 872-73 
(Utah App. 1993); State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 852 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), and the jury here 
rejected defendant's version of the events as incredible. 
Further, defendant has not attacked the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support his conviction, eliminating even that limited 
review of the credibility determination below. See, e.g.. 
Garrett. 849 P.2d at 582. 
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Because the evidence relates to defendant's knowledge that 
the truck was stolen and does not tend to establish his identity 
as the thief, any error from inclusion of the language when 
defendant was not charged with theft or larceny is harmless and 
does not warrant reversal of defendant's conviction. State v. 
Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329# 1331-32 (Utah 1989) (finding an erroneous 
intoxication instruction to be harmless error as the outcome was 
not likely to be different in light of the evidence). Cf. United 
States v. Pineda-Ortuno. 952 F.2d 98, 104 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(finding harmless error in a firearm instruction which included 
forms of the word "use" instead of "carry" where the evidence 
related solely to the carrying of firearms), cert, denied 504 
U.S. 28, 112 S. Ct. 1990 (1992). 
IL. Ag TQ The Merits Of Defendant's Unpreservect claims, The 
Instruction Fully Comports With Federal And State Law And 
Neither Constitutes Error Nor Affects The Substantial Rights 
Of h Party 
Should this Court proceed to review the merits of 
defendant's unpreserved claims, it will find the claims to be 
unpersuasive because the challenged instruction comports with 
both federal and state law# does not constitute error, and does 
not affect defendant's substantial rights. 
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1, Federal Constitutional Law 
Defendant challenges the instruction as a due process 
violation under the federal constitution because it allegedly 
removes the State's responsibility for establishing the mental 
culpability for the charged crime or shifts the burden to 
defendant to disprove his mental culpability.4 Appellant's Br. 
at 17-24. Additionally, he claims that the instruction is 
irrational because it requires that the jury find that he knew 
the truck was stolen simply based on his possession of the truck 
and that his possession is without any rational connection to the 
presumption that he knew the truck was stolen. Id. at 24-26. 
The latter claim misapprehends the instruction. By its 
terms, the instruction requires the jury to base its decision not 
only on defendant's possession of the truck, but also on the 
timing of his possession, the satisfactory nature of his 
explanation for that possession, and the "surrounding 
circumstances shown by the evidence in the case" (R. 110, 
^Although defendant also suggests that the instruction 
violates the state constitution, he does not seek a separate 
state constitutional analysis, instead claiming that the Utah 
Constitution applies with the same force--and apparently under 
the same analysis--as the federal constitution. Appellant's Br. 
at 18 n.5. Accordingly, no independent analysis under Utah's 
constitution is necessary. 
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Addendum B). As explained in subsection C, supra, the evidence 
on these points supports use of the knowledge inference, not use 
of the stealing inference. Further, the jury was required to 
find each of the underlying facts giving rise to the presumption 
of knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 110). Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-1-501 and -503 (1995). Defendant's contention that the 
challenged instruction required less of the jury is without 
support. 
Moreover, the presumption or inference reflected in the 
challenged instruction represents a general legal principle which 
"does not offend the federal constitution." Graves, 717 P.2d at 
717 (relying on Barnes v. United States. 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 
2357 (1973)). This legal principle is based on centuries-old 
common law, and has enjoyed "longstanding and consistent judicial 
approval" throughout its existence. Barnes. 93 S. Ct. at 2362; 
Graves/ 717 P.2d at 718. 
Official acceptance of this legal principle under the 
federal constitution pre-dates defendant's challenge by more than 
two decades. In Barnes. the United States Supreme Court upheld a 
jury instruction similar to the one challenged here. In doing 
so, the Supreme Court reviewed four of its earlier decisions, 
three of which defendant relies on in this case to argue that 
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there is no rational connection between his mere possession of 
the truck and the presumption that he knew it was stolen. Turner 
v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S. Ct. 642 (1970); Leary v. 
United States. 395 U.S. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1532 (1969); United States 
Vr Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 86 S. Ct. 279 (1965); and United States 
v. Gainey. 380 U.S. 63, 85 S. Ct. 754 (1965). The Court held 
that these cases, in the aggregate, establish that 
if a statutory inference submitted to the jury as 
sufficient to support conviction satisfies the 
reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence 
necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a 
rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not 
standard, then it clearly accords with due process. 
93 S. Ct. at 2361-62. The Court determined that the same may be 
said of both statutory and common-law inferences, id. at 2362, 
and went on to find that the inference, as used in Barnes. 
satisfied the due process requirements of the federal 
constitution. Id. at 2363. 
Analyzed under that test, the instruction in this case also 
satisfies federal due process requirements. Without a 
satisfactory explanation from defendant for his possession of the 
truck, the aggregate of the undisputed evidence, defendant's 
admissions, actions, and statements, his credibility, and the 
surrounding circumstances generally, as set forth in subsection 
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C, supra. combine to permit a rational juror to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant knew or reasonably should have 
known that the truck was stolen (R. 110, Addendum B). Barnes, 98 
S. Ct. at 2361-62. Accordingly, the inference satisfies the 
reasonable doubt standard and meets federal due process 
requirements. Id. at 2361-63. 
While the practical effect of the overall jury instruction 
is to shift to defendant the burden of going forward with the 
evidence, such a shift is permissible in the case of this 
specific inference because the inference satisfies the 
reasonable-doubt standard. Id. at 2363 n.ll (relying on Tot v. 
United States. 319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241 (1943)) (recognizing 
that because of the "longstanding and consistent judicial 
approval" the inference has received over the centuries and 
because the inference satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard, 
uthere will certainly be a rational connection between the fact 
presumed or inferred (in this case, knowledge) and the facts the 
Government must prove in order to [permissibly] shift the burden 
of going forward (possession of recently stolen property)."). 
Accordingly, under the federal constitution, the challenged 
instruction neither violates due process requirements nor 
29 
unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof from the State, and 
defendant's assertions to the contrary are without merit. 
2, Utah's Statutory Law 
Defendant challenges the instruction as violative of state 
statutory law because the instruction involves a common law 
presumption that defendant knew the property was stolen, which 
presumption is not "'established by this code or other penal 
statute'" as he claims is required by section 76-1-503. 
Appellant's Br. at 12 (quoting section 76-1-503). The short 
answer to this challenge is to point to the Utah Supreme Court's 
determination that section 76-6-402(1) articulates the general 
principle which includes not only the presumption that defendant 
stole property, but the presumption that defendant knew the 
property was stolen, and to emphasize that the latter presumption 
has been approvingly used in establishing guilt in a number of 
cases. Graves, 717 P.2d at 717-18. 
It should be noted, however, that defendant's argument is 
based on a misinterpretation of section 76-1-503. Instead of 
requiring that a presumption be established by state statute 
before it may be given to a jury (Appellant's Br. at 12), the 
statute simply explains the consequences arising from the giving 
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of evidentiary presumptions which in fact appear in Utah's Code. 
In its entirety, the statute provides: 
An evidentiary presumption established by this 
code or other penal statute has the following 
consequences: 
(1) When evidence of facts which support 
the presumption exist, the issue of the 
existence of the presumed fact must be 
submitted to the jury unless the court is 
satisfied that the evidence as a whole 
clearly negates the presumed fact; 
(2) In submitting the issue of the 
existence of a presumed fact to the jury, the 
court shall charge that while the presumed 
fact must on all evidence be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts 
giving rise to the presumption as evidence of 
the presumed fact. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (1995) . Because "both" presumptions 
identified by defendant are encompassed in the same general 
principle articulated in Utah law in section 76-6-402(1), Graves, 
717 P.2d at 717, then the consequences detailed in section 76-1-
503 would apply and would support the giving of the instruction 
in this case. 
Subsection 1 requires that the trial court submit the 
presumption to the jury when evidence of the facts supporting the 
presumption has been introduced and the court does not believe 
that the evidence "clearly negates the presumed fact [.]" The 
presumption required evidence relating to defendant's possession 
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of stolen property, the period between the time of the theft and 
defendant's possession, and defendant's explanation of his 
possession. Evidence on each of these points was provided at 
trial in this case. See supra. Point IC. Accordingly, evidence 
of the facts underlying the presumption challenged by defendant--
that he knew the property was stolen--was introduced. Further, 
nothing in either the record or defendant's brief suggests that 
the trial court believed that the evidence negated the 
presumption in the instruction. The trial court's rejection of 
defendant's challenge to the instruction reasonably suggests that 
the court felt the evidence warranted use of the presumption (R. 
268, Addendum C). Hence, subsection 1 was met and required that 
the challenged presumption be submitted to the jury. 
Once it is decided that the presumption should go to the 
jury, subsection 2 requires that the court inform the jury that 
uthe presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt" and that the facts supporting the presumption 
are legally regarded as being evidence of the presumed fact. The 
challenged instruction met this requirement by stating that the 
presumption could arise only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of each of the outlined supporting facts win light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in this case," 
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and that, upon establishment of each supporting fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the jury could legally presume that defendant 
knew the property was stolen (R. 110, Addendum B). Further, 
several other instructions repeatedly informed the jury that the 
elements of the offense must be found to exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt (R. 101, 105, 112). Accordingly, the 
requirements of section 76-1-503 were met, and defendant's claim 
that the instruction violates this code section is without merit. 
2L* Utah's Case Law 
Finally, defendant argues that Utah case law provides that 
the presumption contained in section 76-6-402(1) is addressed 
only to the trial court for use in determining whether the 
evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case, and that 
instructing the jury on the presumption constitutes error. 
Appellant's Br. at 13-17. 
While the statutory presumption is to be used by the trial 
court when necessary to determine the sufficiency of the State's 
prima facie case, State V, Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 326-27 (Utah 
1985), it is not limited to that use. The Utah Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held: 
'The statute, properly construed, is directed to the 
court. . . . [T]he statute provides a standard by which 
to determine the sufficiency of the evidence for 
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submitting the case to the jury. The statute may 
properly be used to defeat a claim by a defendant that 
the State has, as a matter of law, failed to establish 
a prima facie case against the defendant.' 
Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326-27 (citations omitted); see al££ State 
v. Pacheco. 712 P.2d 192, 194-95 (Utah 1985) (the statute is 
directed to the court for determining whether the evidence 
warrants submission of the case to the jury), cert, denied, 479 
U.S. 813, 107 S. Ct. 64 (1986); State v. Asay. 631 P.2d 861, 864 
(Utah 1981) (the statute deals with the sufficiency of the 
evidence to go to the jury, which is a matter for the court); 
State v. Crowder. 197 P.2d 917, 921 (Utah 1948) (while the 
statute "determines for the court what evidence is sufficient to 
constitute a prima facie case . . . it does not require the court 
to instruct the jury that such facts constitute a prima facie 
case"). This does not mean that the jury is not to be given the 
presumption, where appropriate, for use in its deliberations--
only that they should not be instructed to make a determination 
about the State's prima facie case. State v. Perez. Case No. 
950333-CA, slip op. at 7-8 (Utah App. Sept. 6, 1996) (approving 
of a jury instruction on the statutory presumption which omits 
the criticized "prima facie" language and emphasizes the 
permissible nature of the presumption); State v. Johnson. 745 
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P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987) (instructing the jury on the statutory 
presumption is permissible so long as the prima facie language of 
the statute is not used); State v. Smith. 726 P.2d 1232, 1235-36 
(Utah 1986) (although instructing the jury in the statutory 
language is error, such error is harmless where explanatory 
instructions made clear that the jury faced a permissible 
inference); Chambers. 709 P.2d at 327 (a jury instruction 
instructing the jury in terms of "prima facie" is erroneous as it 
could only be confusing and might lead to inappropriate 
conclusions); Crowder. 197 P.2d at 921 (it is error to instruct 
the jury on the question of whether the evidence is sufficient to 
constitute a prima facie case); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
503 (1995) (evidentiary presumptions based on Utah statutes must 
be given to the jury in appropriate instances). 
The giving of the challenged instruction was recently upheld 
by a panel of this court in State v. Perez, Case No. 950333-CA, 
slip op. at 7-8 (Utah App. Sept. 6, 1996). The Perez instruction 
is identical to the challenged one in this case except for three 
points: 1) the challenged instruction uses the words "the 
property" where the Perez instruction uses "it"; 2) the 
instruction in this case uses an additional phrase not contained 
in the Perez instruction; and 3) the challenged instruction uses 
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the word "those" where the Perez instruction used "these." The 
instruction in both cases, with the two differences in brackets, 
provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from 
which you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in 
light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence 
in the case, that the person in possession of the stolen 
property stole the property and knew that it [the property] 
was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in possession of 
property, (2) that the property was stolen, (3) that such 
possession was not too remote in point of time from the 
theft, and (4) that no satisfactory explanation [of such 
possession has been given or] appears from the evidence, 
then you may infer from these [those] facts and find that 
the defendant stole the property and knew the property was 
stolen. 
(R. 110, Addendum B). Perez, slip op. at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
The Perez instruction was upheld as a permissible inference which 
eliminated the impermissible "prima facie" term, emphasized the 
fact finder's discretion, and did not impermissibly shift the 
burden of proof to defendant. Id. at 8. The latter point was 
emphasized in this case by defense counsel in his closing 
argument when she expressly reiterated that the phrase "may 
infer" means exactly what it says: the State continued to carry 
"the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the [defendant] 
knew or had reason to know that that [sic] truck was stolen[,]" 
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and the ''instruction doesn't shift that burden suddenly back" on 
defendant (R. 287-88). Accordingly, the essentially identical 
instruction in this case is in full compliance with Utah case 
law, and defendant's argument to the contrary is without merit. 
Perez, slip op. at 6-7; Smith. 726 P.2d at 1234-36. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING REMARKS DID NOT SUGGEST A NON-
EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR A VERDICT AND, IN ANY EVENT, 
RESULTED IN NO PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT 
In his rebuttal closing remarks, the prosecutor touched on 
points defense counsel had made in her closing argument, outlined 
the evidence supporting a determination that defendant knew that 
the truck was stolen, then closed with the following argument: 
[PROSECUTOR:] Well, members of the jury, I submit 
to you that if after this case is all over you walk out 
to the parking lot and you discovered that somebody has 
stolen your vehicle, and two or three days go by and 
all of a sudden as you're driving down the road, you 
see your vehicle and you see Mr. Carlson driving that 
vehicle, and you pull him over and stop him and you say 
to him, "What are you doing in my vehicle?" --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I object to this 
part of the argument. 
THE COURT: It's appropriate argument. Go ahead. 
[PROSECUTOR]: And you say to him, "What are you 
doing in my vehicle?" 
37 
And he says to you, "Steve Johnson gave me this 
vehicle," I submit to you there isn't one of you that 
would let him go, that would simply let him walk away. 
What you would do is call the police or you'd hang 
on to him yourself and yet, that's exactly what the 
defense is asking you to do in this case, to let him go 
because he comes in to this courtroom and tells you 
that the story he gave Officer Sheets when he pulled 
him over was that somebody just gave him this vehicle. 
Well, members of the jury, I submit that you 
wouldn't buy it if you were in that situation, and I 
submit also that you shouldn't buy it in this case. 
I'm not saying the defendant stole the vehicle, but 
what we are saying was that he was in possession of a 
stolen motor vehicle and he knew or had reason to 
believe it was stolen. 
(R. 293-94) (a copy of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument is 
attached as addendum E). 
Defendant claims that this portion of the prosecutor's 
closing remarks constitute misconduct because it was not based on 
the evidence and improperly urged the jurors to put themselves in 
the position of the victim to decide the verdict. Appellant's 
Br. at 28-31. The effect, he claims, was prejudicial because of 
the wxless than compelling proof" of his mental culpability in 
this case. Id. at 29-31. The trial court's response was that 
"the argument was a reasonable inference of the facts and . . ., 
although a little pointed, was not unduly inflammatory" (R. 295) 
(attached in addendum E). 
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The two prong test for determining whether a prosecutor has 
engaged in misconduct and whether reversal is warranted is well 
established. The defendant must show that: 1) "the actions or 
remarks of (the prosecutor) call to the attention of the jury a 
matter it would not be justified in considering in determining 
its verdict[;]" and 2) Munder the circumstances of the particular 
case, . • . the error is substantial and prejudicial such that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there 
would have been a more favorable result." State v. Tenney, 913 
P.2d 750, 754-55 (Utah App.) (quotations omitted), cert, denied. 
923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996); £££ State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848, 852 
(Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
Moreover, counsel on both sides are given considerable latitude 
in their closing arguments. "They have the right to fully 
discuss from their perspective the evidence and all inferences 
and deductions it supports." State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 
1225 (Utah 1989) . 
The challenged remarks are a logical interpretation of the 
evidence from the prosecution's perspective and demonstrate for 
the jury the implausibility of defendant's justification for his 
claimed ignorance that the truck was stolen. The comment did not 
suggest that the jury had uan obligation to convict . . . on some 
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basis other than solely on the evidence." state v. Andreaann. 
718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986) (urging the jury to convict 
defendants because they "are not the only ones here and they are 
not the only ones we need to be concerned about."). Instead, the 
prosecutor simply urged the jury to use some common sense when 
evaluating the defendant's explanation as to how he came to be 
driving a truck belonging to Steve Clark and never suspected that 
it was stolen, despite the presence of a second ignition, the 
absence of the front license plate and the registration, and the 
fact that he obtained it from a woman who had already allegedly 
stolen defendant's own car. While common sense is not a 
replacement for the trial court's instructions, "it is a time-
honored, wholly compatible part of the deliberative, decision-
making process." State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 
1989) . 
Further, the prosecutor's comments were not prejudicial. 
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct 
or remark will not be presumed prejudicial." State v. Troy. 688 
P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted). In cases where the 
proof is less compelling, "this Court will more closely 
scrutinize the conduct." Id. The evidence against defendant in 
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this case was very compelling, despite defendant's attempt to 
portray it as weak. See discussion of facts, supra. Point IC. 
Given this evidence, there is little likelihood that, even 
absent the prosecutor's challenged remarks--which emphasized the 
incredibility of defendant's story by asking the jurors simply to 
use common sense when viewing it--the jury would have acquitted 
defendant. Because the prosecutor's remarks, read in context, 
sought no more than was appropriate from the jury and resulted in 
no prejudice to defendant, defendant's claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct must fail. Cummins. 839 P.2d at 852-53; State v. 
Peters. 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this d?Y day of October, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehi-
cle, trailer, or semitrailer — Penalty. 
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or 
unlawfully taken to receive or transfer possession of the motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer from or to another; or 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer 
that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully 
taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of 
his duty. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, t 115; C. 1943, 
57-3a-116; L. 1989, ch. 274, * 23; C. 1953, 
41-1-112; renumbered by L. 1992, ch. 1, 
t 173. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24,1989, inserted "second 
degree" before "felony" at the end of the sec-
tion, and made stylistic changes. 
The 1992 amendment, effective January 30, 
1992, renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as § 41-1*112; inserted the subsec-
tion designations; substituted "motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer" for "vehicle" in three 
places; and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that 
the person in possession of the stolen property stole the 
property and knew that the property was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt (1) that the defendant was in possession of property, (2) 
that the property was stolen, (3) that such possession was not 
too remote in point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or 
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts 
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the 
property was stolen. 
O O O J i o 
ADDENDUM C 




 ? HYDE: Thank you, .your Honor. 
We're also objecting/ your Honor, to the state's 
instruction and it's not numbered, so I will just briefly 
read it so Ircan refer to it, that possession of property 
recently stolen,:, if .not.-satisfactorily explained, is 
ordinarily a circumstance„from which you may reasonably 
draw the inference and find in light of the surrounding 
circumstances shown by the evidence in the case that the 
person in possession of the stolen property, stole the 
property and knew.that the property was stolen, thus if you 
find from the-evidence - and beyond a reasonable doubt, one, 
that the defendant was in possession of property, two, that 
the property was stolen, three, that such possession was not 
too remote in point of time from the theft, and four, that 
no satisfactory explanation of such possession has been 
given or appears from the evidence, you may infer from those 
facts and find that the-defendant stole the property and 
knew that the property was stolen* 
Your Honor, I think that instruction is based on 
76r-6-402« 76r-6*-402 does creates ..presumption* .It creates 
a presumption .that possession of ...property recently stolen 
is prima facie evidence that the,person.in possession stole 
0 6 0 2 6 V 
1 the property. 
2 Mr. Carlson .is not being charged with theft of this 
3 vehicle. He's -being charged under the Motor Vehicle Code. 
4 He's being charged with possession of a stolen vehicle 
5 knowing that it v a s stolen, 
6 The - first ^ part: of 76-6-402 states that the following] 
7 presumption shall be applicable to this part, and it is 
8 the defense's position that it does not apply to other parts 
9 of the code and therefore — 
10 THE COURT: The Court is — the case that was 
11 submitted by both counsel, the Court dealt with the instruc-
12 tioh — what's the case citation? 
13 MS.~HYDE: That's State versus Graves, your Honor. 
14 MR. JONES: 717 Pacific 2d. 717. 
15 [ MS. HYDE: That's correct. 
16 THE COURT: Based on the Court's reading of that 
17 case, your objection is noted but overruled. 
18 MS. HYDE: Okay, and your Honor, just let me state 
19 for the record briefly and I =won Vt _ try _ to take up too much 
20 time..on this, .but I ^ need.to make a .satisfactory record for 
21 appeal, that it's, the defense's position that State versus 
22 Graves does not apply to this case because it was the — the 
23 issue raised on appeal was whether there was sufficient 
u evidence"to-convict* Thatfs what-the defendant argued* 
*5 He did not at trial in the Graves case offer any explanation 
^ v V & kj ij 
as to why he had possession of the stolen vehicle. 
What-the Court in' this case did is they said, well, 
76-6-402 articulates a-general presumption of law. Well, 
not a presumption but a general principle is the word that 
they used, and because it could be inferred by reasonable 
people that the-defendant did not explain •— give any 
explanation why he had the stolen vehicle, that there was not| 
necessarily insufficient evidence to convict, and I don't 
think that this case ever even addressed the issue of whetherl 
or not a jury instruction would be applicable in this 
particular case and so I do not believe that it's on point. 
THE COURT: Your objection is respectfully over-
ruled. The Court relies on the case cited. 
MS.r KYDE: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MS. EYDE: I think that covers it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
thereupon, the jury entered the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: The record will reflect the presence 
of the jury," both counsel ""-and the defendant, 
:The evidence has-been presented in its entirety. 
The Court has:resolved-legal issues out of the presence of 
the jury. It is now, after both parties have rested, tine 
for the Court.to instruct you on the law, invite argument 
from counsel
 f" "and then submit' the case to the jury for their 
000261; 
ADDENDUM D 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory expla-
nation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the 
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for 
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-402, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, i 76-6-402; 1974, ch. 32, { 16. 
ADDENDUM E 
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1 •again,-.the .language says nay infer because, as I told you 
2 before, it is-the-'prosecutor who has the burden of proving 
3 J Dwayne — t h a t Dwayne is guilty of this offense* It's the 
prosecutor who has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
5 doubt that he knew or"had reason to know that that truck 
6 was stolen and this instruction doesn't shift that burden 
7 suddenly back on Dwayne, and I wanted to point that out to 
8 you because it' is"important. 
9
 * * The reason why the prosecutor has the burden of 
10 proving Dwayne's guilt is because a long time ago, the fore-
11 fathers of our constitution had experienced oppressive 
12 government conduct. • They knew vhat it was like to be 
13 accused/of a crime and hauled into court and then told, 
14 okay, you prove to-us that you didn't do it, and how unfair 
15 and unjust that was, and that was why it was decided that if 
16 the state wishes to take someone's liberty, that they must 
17 make the showing that they must prove beyond a reasonable 
18 doubt that he is guilty, and ladies and gentlemen, Dwayne did 
19 not know that that vehicle was stolen. 
20 He has made a~ lot of mistakes, mistakes that he will 
21 pay for. This was one i:hing he did not do, and I ask you 
22 to return a verdict of not guilty. 
23 THE COURT:- Thank you, counsel. 
24 Rebuttal? 
25
 MR. JONES: You know,- the defendant or the defense 
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1 attorney says to you that her client was brutally honest 
2 with you.:ii^ this courtroom, . Brutally honest in what respect? 
3 ; v The real-question, you know, why did he lie to the 
4 officer about his identity? He said to you on direct 
5 examination "The-reason I lied is I was on suspension and I 
6 knew if I told the truth, I could be in trouble." 
7 - And then on cross-examination we finally get him to 
8 admit that that wasn't-the only reason that he lied to the 
9 officer; it wasnft just driving on suspension. He finally 
10 admitted to you that there was another reason. It was 
11 outstanding warrants for his arrest. 
12 Does it seem to you like he's brutally honest when 
13 the only way we find out that the reason he lied to this 
14 officer was because of the warrants? It didn't come from 
15 the defendant on direct examination. It came as a result of 
16 cross-examination. If I hadn't asked him any questions at 
17 all, if he'd just got on.-the. stand and told his story, you 
18 would never know that the reason he lied to the officer 
19 didn't have to do just with driving on suspension, it had to 
20 do with the outlanding warrants. 
21 Can you honestly say that this man is brutally 
22 honest with you when we find him in a lie on the witness 
23 stand today, this afternoon? He wasn't, brutally honest 
24 with the officer at the time of this' incident in July and he 
25 wasn't honest with you today in' this courtroom, and yet, the 
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1
 defense -says you should believe him? You should find him 
2
 hto be .credible and -honest and truthful? After what you've 
3
 heard *frem fois representation? 
4
 T submit-he's not'honest at all in this case. He 
5
 lied tor offlfcer" Sheets and he lied to you in this courtroom. 
6
 Next-the -defense attorney said, well, the defendant1 
7
 mother has corroborated his' story. Okay. You heard his 
8 mother testify. 'The only thing she corroborates is the fact 
9 that this girl named Laura borrowed the defendant's Nissan. 
10 The mother never said anything about the vehicle that was 
11 stolen. She never testified at all about this Mazda pickup 
12 truck. I listened to her testimony. Not one word from her 
13 about this stolen vehicle, and so her testimony, I submit, 
14 doesn't help you resolve the issue in this case because 
15 the defendant's mother only talked about Laura and borrowing 
16 the Nissan truck and that's not a critical issue in this 
17 case. It doesn't make any difference if Laura borrowed the 
18 defendant's Nissan. The issue is, was the defendant driving 
19 a stolen motor vehicle and did he know or have reason to 
20 believe it was stolen. 'That's: what we're asking you to 
21 decide in this' case/ and yet, the mother talks about some-
22 thing that really doesn't help you resolve that question 
23 at all. 
24 J Next the defense said, well, Troy corroborates the 
story because"he -tells about'bringing a battery to the 
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1 defendant and again, so what? Okay, Troy brings him a 
2 battery to put into this stolen vehicle. Does that help 
3 you decide.the issue of whether the defendant was in 
4 possession of a stolen motor vehicle? Does it help you to 
5 decide the question.of whether the defendant knew or had 
6 reason to believe It was stolen? Again, -I-just don't see 
7 that it helps you in -the-ultimate issue in this case. 
8 Next the defense said, -well, we put Josh on the 
9 stand. -Josh said he saw the ^defendant driving the. vehicle 
10 for three or four days.- Okay. He was driving the vehicle 
11 three or four days. Again, does that help -you resolve the 
12 ultimate issue in this case? 
13 Steve Clark said, "I noticed the vehicle was gone 
14 on the/22nd. We called the police." He said, "My recollec-
15 tion is the last time I-saw the. vehicle was about two days 
16 before." He said, "I've got 150 vehicles on the lot. My 
17 recollection is the last time I saw it was two days earlier." 
18 Again, does it make any difference whether the 
19 vehicle had been taken for two days or four days? I submit 
20 again, ,it really doesn't: help you resolve the ultimate issue 
21 in this case, whether he had the car on the 18th of July or 
22 the 20th, whether he had cit two days or four days. 
23 The point is, when 'the officer stops the. vehicle or 
24 stops him getting out of. the. vehicle, he's in possession of 
25 a stolen motor, vehicle on the 22nd of July, 
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1 The defense says, well, there's no evidence that 
2 this vehicle was stolen. No one would ever know that it 
3 was stolen. 
4
 Well, there is evidence that someone would know 
5. this was a stolen vehicle* Number one, it's got a false 
6 license plate on the back of the. vehicle, but number two, 
7 probably most important is the fact that there was a 
8 secondary ignition in the. vehicle. Officer Sheets said he 
9 didn't notice it. The defendant categorically denies it's 
10 there, but Mr. Clark, the owner of the vehicle, I said to 
11 him, "When you got the vehicle back that night sometime 
12 after eight o'clock, did you notice anything?" 
13 He said, "Yeah, the first thing I noticed is that 
14 the camper shell was gone." 
15 And I said, "Okay. Did you notice anything else?" 
16 And he said, "Yeah, there was what's called an 
17 after market ignition." 
18 Boy. You'd have to be blind not to know that there' 
19 something wrong with this, vehicle, and who is it that's 
20 driving this, vehicle around? Who is it that's, putting the 
21 key in this after action ignition, system?. It's this 
22 defendant, and yes, Officer Sheets didn't pick up on it, 
23 but Mr. Clark, the man who owns this, vehicle, did pick up 
24 on it and it' tells you more^ thanvanything else in this case 
25 that whoever.'s driving this has got to either know or have 
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1 reason to believe that they*re In possession of a stolen 
2 motor vehicle* 
3
 J Well, .members of the jury,. • I submit to you that 
if after .this case is -all-aover you walk out to the parking 
5 lot and you discovered that somebody has stolen your 
6 vehicle, and two,or three days go by and all of a sudden 
7
 as you're driving down the road, you see your vehicle and 
8 you see Mr. Carlson driving that vehicle, and you pull him 
9 over and stop him and you say to him, "What are you doing in 
10 my vehicle?" — 
11 MS. HYDE: Your Honor, I object to this part of the 
12 argument. 
13 THE COURT: It's appropriate argument. 
14 Go ahead. 
15 MR. JONES: And you say to him, "What are you doing 
16 in my vehicle?" 
17
 j And he says to you, "Steve Johnson gave me this 
vehicle," I submit to you there isn't one of you that would 
let him go, that would simply let him walk away. 
20 What you would do is call the police or you'd hang 
21 on to him yourself and yet, that's exactly what the 
22 defense is asking you to do in this case, to let him go 
23 because he comes in to this courtroom and tells you that the 
24 j story he gave.Officer Sheets when he pulled him over was 






 "Well, members of the juryf I submit that you 
2
 wouldn't buy it if you were in that, situation, and I submit 
3
 also that you shouldn't: buy it in this case. I'm not saying 
4
 the defendant stole the vehicle, but what we are saying 
5
 was that he was in possession of a stolen motor vehicle and 
6
 he knew or had reason to believe it was stolen. 
7
 Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: The Clerk will swear the Bailiff. 
9
 (Whereupon, the Clerk administered the oath 
10 to the Bailiff.) 
11 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, two matters. The 
12 verdict form will only apply to the question on the stolen 
13 vehicle which is Count One of the Information. 
1* The other counts have been taken care of by agree-
15 ment to plead guilty on the other matters, and that's what 
16 the verdict form will deal with, and the jury instructions 
17 will go with you and any exhibits that are to be sent into 
18
 the jury room. 
19 (Whereupon, the"jury exited the courtroom.) 
20 THE COURT: ^The record will reflect that the Court 
21 is in session out of the presence of the jury. The jury has 
22 retired to commence its deliberations. 
23 Counsel has a motion. 
24 I MS. HYDE: Your Honor, for the record, I'd like to 
state the reasons for my objection to the prosecutor's 
34 
25 
1 rebuttal remarks and move for a mistrial based on that. 
2 Your Honor, I believe that the prosecutor's 
3 remarks argued essentially future dangerousness of this 
4 individual, that what he :did was t:o throw .out this factor 
5 that Mr. .Carlson -was going to be stealing one of their cars 
6 if they did not find him guilty, and I think that that is 
7 inappropriate to do, and I think that it is not commenting 
8 on the evidence. There's nothing in.the evidence to suggest 
9 that and it is entirely inappropriate.: It-gives the jurors 
10 grounds which are not .legal ,grounds to convict and it also 
tt arouses their .fear.and their-hostility to be.given a — 
12 painted a picture of this man committing crimes against them 
13 if they do not convict. 
14 Based on that, your Honor, I would ask for a new 
15 trial. 
16 THE COURT: The mot ion1.s denied. The Court finds 
17 that the argument was a reasonable inference of the facts 
18 presented in the case and the argument was, -although a little 
19 pointed, was not unduly inflammatory, nor did it, in the 
20 Court's opinion, arouse the passion or the prejudice of the 
21 jury. 
22 Court's in recess* 
23 (Whereupon, a recess was taken. 
24 THE COURT: -The.record .will reflect the presence 
25 of the jury, the defendant and counsel for the defendant. 
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